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“… the most interesting and important issues 
involving the application of equivalence scales 
to tax equity questions are intimately bound up 
with the variation of equivalence scales with 
the level of income”    
(Seneca and Taussig, 1971, p. 255). 
1. Introduction
1 
Ever since the days of Vickrey (1947) it has been well-appreciated that household needs must 
be taken into account in designing an equitable income tax. Various devices have become 
familiar: exemptions, deductions, tax credits, and the use of income splitting. Some of these 
approaches are consistent with the equivalence scale methodology. Thus the exemption can be 
thought of as an absolute equivalence scale rendering taxable incomes equivalent by fixed 
subtractions (Lambert and Yitzhaki (1997)). Similarly income splitting as e.g. in the French 
Quotient Familial corresponds to deflating incomes by fixed relative factors for tax purposes 
and then aggregating liabilities of the equivalent adults (Ebert (1997) and Lambert (2001)). 
This is all well and good, but recent theoretical research (Donaldson and Pendakur (1999)) 
demonstrates that income dependent equivalence scales provide less restrictive household 
demands and can, under certain conditions, be uniquely estimated from demand data.
2 
Empiricists have long been interested in income dependent equivalence scales. As Seneca and 
Taussig (1971) noted some time ago (see above) tax equity must take such income depend-
ency into account. 
In this paper we explore the question of horizontal equity in the income tax and the implica-
tions for progression (vertical equity) when the equivalence scale depends on income level. 
We identify three different principles which might be used to secure horizontal equity 
(namely the ‘equal tax treatment of equals’). We go on to examine whether ‘equal progression 
among equals’ obtains under each of these principles. The analysis uncovers some interesting 
properties of constant equivalence scales in the process. It emerges that both classical hori-
zontal equity and the ‘equal progression among equals’ criterion can be met using one of our 
three equity principles in conjunction with one of Donaldson and Pendakur’s relative scales 
(exhibiting constant income elasticity). 
                                                 
1  The paper forms part of the research programme of the TMR network Living Standards, Inequality and 
Taxation [Contract No. ERBFMRXCT980248] of the European Communities whose financial support is 
gratefully acknowledged.  
2  See also Habib (1979) and Conniffe (1992).   - 2 -
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we establish the notation and definition 
and some examples of (income dependent) equivalence scales. Section 3 sets out the three 
equity principles we advocate and explores the relationships between these. In section 4 the 
consequences for income tax progression are determined for each of these principles. We 
identify the conditions for equal progression among equals at this stage. Section 5 sums up the 
paper and provides conclusions and suggestions for further research.  
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2. Preliminaries 
Let  0 x >  be household gross income. Furthermore let  ( ) tx, assumed differentiable, be the 
household’s tax liability and let  ( ) ( ) vx x tx =−  be disposable income. We assume that 
() 0 tx>  and  () 0 vx> , i.e. we focus on tax paying households. Define as  () () , f xx ε  the 
elasticity of a differentiable function  ( ) f x  with respect to x. Residual and liability progres-
sion, respectively, of the tax schedule  ( ) tx are  ( ) ( ) ( ) , RPx vx x ε =  and  () () () , LP x t x x ε = .  
For simplicity we consider two household types, namely single person households () s  and 
couples  () c . The tax and net income schedules will be  ( ) s tx  and  () s vx , and  () c tx  and 
() c vx , respectively. The progression measures  ( ) RPx and  ( ) LP x  will also carry suffixes s 
and c in what follows. We assume that singles are the reference type and will denote by  ( ) Sx 
the equivalent income function which expresses the living standard of a couple with income x 
where  () Sx is both continuous and strictly increasing in x.
3 Later we shall apply this measure 
to pretax income x and to posttax income  ( ) c vx . For the poorest couples equivalent incomes 
may be zero or negative. Such couples could be expected to receive low income support from 
the government rather than pay taxes. In everything which follows we shall assume all 
equivalent incomes to be positive, thereby focussing on tax payers only.  
The general form of relative equivalence scale uses a deflator  ( ) mx so that  () ( ) Sx x mx = , 
whilst the general form for an absolute equivalence scale,  () ax say, satisfies 
() () Sx x ax =− . Assuming couples to be needier than single adults we have  () 1 mx>  and 
() 0 ax>  for all x.
4 The familiar case of a constant relative equivalence scale is  () mx m =  for 
all x, but as we have said in the introduction this need not be. Donaldson and Pendakur (1999) 
have proposed  () () mx x x
α β =  as an improved specification (see their equation (4.14)), 
where α  and  0 β >  are constants. The constant absolute scale is given by  () ax a =  for all x. 
Donaldson and Pendakur (equation (3.7)) suggest  ( ) ( ) 1 ax x α βα =− +      as an improve-
ment in this context where  0 α >  and β  are constants.  
                                                 
3  For more on this function see Donaldson and Pendakur (1999) and Ebert (2000). 
4  Had we chosen couples as reference type and applied these scales to single persons’ incomes then we would 
have  () 1 mx<  and  ( ) 0 ax< .   - 4 -
3. Equity  principles 
If the tax schedule for singles is  () s tx  and the net income schedule  ( ) s vx , what should be the 
associated schedules for couples in order to secure equity? The principle of classical horizon-
tal equity calls for the equal tax treatment of equals. For us equals shall be those with the 
same (gross) living standard. Let a single have gross income  s x  and a couple  c x . 
Let us consider first the use of relative scales. The pretax living standards of the single person 
and the couple are equal for the relative scale  ( ) mx if  ( ) s cc x xm x = . Evaluating post tax 
incomes in the same way, one principle of horizontal equity, which we might call naïve hori-










=⇒=  (1) 
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  () () ()
cs
x







  () () ()
cs
x






One interpretation for these results is that the equivalence scale  ( ) mx splits the couple into 
() mx equivalent adults and taxes each according to the given schedule for singles (see Ebert 
(1997), Ebert and Moyes (2000) for the case of constant equivalence scales  () mx m = ). That 
is, pretax circumstances, namely gross income x, determine the number of equivalent adults 
the tax system will judge a two person household to contain, each to be taxed as a single per-
son. Tax practitioners are becoming familiar with this procedure; but a more careful consid-
eration reveals that NHE-R is not a pure horizontal equity criterion. For horizontal equity per 
se (HE) the condition must be 
  () () () () sc s s c c x Sx v x Sv x =⇒=  (4) 
which taking  () () Sx x mx =  implies that   - 5 -









No longer can the interpretation involving equivalent adults be said to hold. Rearranging (5) 
we find 
  () () () () () () () ()
cs c s
x x
tx m x t m x m vx v
mx mx
 
=+ −    
 
, (6) 
the second term being a correction factor which arises whenever the equivalence scale is not 
constant. This means that the appropriate deflator for posttax incomes differs from the one 
applied in the naïve case (recall (3)). Moreover the equitable tax is now defined implicitly (by 
(5) or (6)) rather than explicitly (as in (3)). We shall compare both criteria in what follows. 
Turning to absolute scales  () ax naïve horizontal equity (NHE-A) would demand  
  () () ( ) ( ) s cc s s c c c x xa x v x v x a x =− ⇒ = −  (7) 
equivalently 
  v x v x ax ax cs b g b g c h b g =− + (8) 
or 
  tx txa x cs b g b g c h =− . (9) 
Condition (9) rationalizes the use of income related deductions, again familiar to the tax 
designer. But NHE-A is not a pure horizontal equity criterion either; returning to the criterion 
HE as in (4) and setting  () ( ) Sx x ax =−  we find  
  vx vxa x a vx cs c b g b g c h b g c h =− +  (10) 
and, equivalently, 
  t x t x ax ax av x cs c bg bg c h bg bg c h di = −+−  (11) 
in which the last term represents the necessary correction for nonconstancy of the scale. 
This discussion has brought up three possible equity criteria, namely NHE-R, HE, and 
NHE-A. How are these related? First in the case of constant scales we observe the following:   - 6 -
Proposition 1 
(i)  If  () mx m =  for all x, then the criteria NHE-R and HE both reduce to 
  () () and , cs cs
x x
vx m v tx m t
mm
  ==  
 
  
i.e. both criteria are equivalent. 
(ii)  If  () ax a =  for all x, then the criteria NHE-A and HE both reduce to 
  () ( ) () ( ) and , cs c s vx vxa tx txa =− =−  
i.e. both criteria are equivalent. 
The constant scales of either kind reduce, respectively, to income tax splitting and to the use 
of lump-sum tax exemptions. For nonconstancy of scales the criteria will in general differ.  
Allowing that relative and absolute equivalence scales may depend on income we can inter-
pret any equivalent income function  ( ) Sx in terms of both relative and absolute scales, 
namely we can set 




=  and  () ( ) Sx x ax =−  (12) 
by appropriate choice of the functions  ( ) mx and  ( ) ax: 
 
















For the constant relative scale  () mx m = , the corresponding absolute scale is income related: 
() () 11 ax mx =− ; for the constant absolute scale  ( ) ax a = , the relative scale is 
() ( ) mx x x a =− . Donaldson and Pendakur (1999) who exploit this connection specify the 
absolute version of their relative scale  () () mx x x
α β =  as  () () ax x x
α β =−  and the relative 
version of their absolute scale  () ( ) 1 ax x α βα =− +      as  ( )( ) mx x x α β =+ . This latter 
scale has also been proposed by Conniffe (1992). The equivalent income function presented 
in Ebert (2000),   - 7 -
  () ( ) ln 1 1
x Sx e
δ α δ  =+ −   (14) 













  and  () () ( )
1
ln 1 1
x ax x e
δ α
δ
= −+ − . (15) 
Can the same equivalent income function  ( ) Sx, when interpreted in these two different ways 
(i.e. in terms of a relative and absolute scale), generate two different equity principles? The 
answer is ‘no’ for the principle HE, but ‘yes’ for the naïve principles so long as there is any 
tax at all.  
Proposition 2 




== −  
(i)  conditions (5), (6), (10), and (11) for HE are all equivalent. 
(ii)  NHE-R and NHE-A are equivalent if and only if  ( ) s vx x =  and  ( ) 0 s tx =  for all x.
5 
Hence the three criteria necessarily differ. 
What is the tax designer to do? If faced with a constant relative scale ( () ax varying with 
income) she should select NHE-R which is both transparent (in terms of income tax splitting) 
and equivalent to HE. If faced with a constant absolute scale ( ( ) mx varying) she should 
select NHE-A which is transparent (in terms of exemptions) and equivalent to HE. For all 
other equivalence scales ( () mx and  ( ) ax varying) there is a choice between three distinct 
principles: HE, NHE-R, and NHE-A. As we shall shortly see, the consequences for the degree 
of progression which singles and couples face may be very different. 
 
                                                 
5  The proof of this and all other mathematical assertions made in this paper may be found in the appendix 
(which is not intended for publication).   - 8 -
4.  Consequences for progression 
Let us begin by positing an equivalent income function  ( ) Sx. Given any particular tax sched-
ule for singles  () s tx , with residual and liability progression measures  () s RPx  and  ( ) s LP x , 
what are the consequences for the degree of progression faced by the couples when each of 
the equity principles NHE-R, NHE-A, and HE are applied? 
When  () () Sx x mx =  and NHE-R is invoked then 
  () () () () () () 11 1 , cs
x




−= − −      
 (16) 
and 
  () () () () () () 11 1 , cs
x




−= − −      
 (17) 
can be shown.  
It is quite immediate that, if singles face constant residual progression α , namely 
() s vx k x
α =  for some k, then couples will not necessarily face constant progression. From (2) 
() ()
1
c vx k m x x
α α −
=   so that  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1, c RPx m xx αα ε =+− . The following general 
results can be inferred.
6  
Proposition 3 
Suppose that Sx xmx b g b g =  and that NHE-R is satisfied. Then 


















                                                 
6  Notice under the maintained assumptions  ( ) ( ) ,1 mx x ε <  for all x (since  () x mx has to be strictly 
increasing in x).   - 9 -
(ii) if () () ,0 : mx x ε <    () () ()
1 cs s
xx
RP x RP RP
mx mx
 
⇔    
 
OO  
 and  () () ()
1 cs s
xx
LP x LP LP
mx mx
 
⇔    
 
OO  
(iii) if  () () ,0 : mx x ε >    () () ()
1 cs s
xx
RP x RP RP
mx mx
 
⇔    
 
NO  
 and  () () ()
1 cs s
xx
LP x LP LP
mx mx
 
⇔    
 
NO . 
For the constant relative scale ((i) of Proposition 3) the income splitting device ensures that 
couples face the same progression as singles with the same living standard. For a nonconstant 
equivalence scale which decreases with income (Seneca and Taussig (1971) display such 
scales) the progression faced by couples under NHE-R is unambiguously higher at each living 
standard than for singles (provided that the given  ( ) s tx  is progressive). For equivalence 
scales which are increasing with income (Donaldson and Pendakur (1999) exhibit such scales) 
couples face unambiguously less progression than singles at their living standard.  
Now suppose that NHE-A is invoked, given the same equivalent income function  () Sx, now 
written as  () x ax − , and single tax schedule  ( ) s tx . We can show 
  () () () ( ) () , cs LP x LP x a x x a x x ε =− −  (18) 
in respect of liability progression, but no general useful expression for residual progression 
obtains. The resulting proposition is less comprehensive in this case, but still informative. 
Proposition 4 
Suppose that  () () Sx x ax =−  and that NHE-A is satisfied. 
(i)  () () () ( ) ( ) ,1 cs L Px L Px ax ax x ε −⇔ ON  






  () () mx m ⇔=  for all x then  
  () () () ( ) ( ) 1. cs s RP x RP x a x RP x a x  −⇔−  ON  
(iii) If  () ax a =  for all x, then   - 10 -
  () ( ) cs RPx R Pxa ≤−  for all x. 
As part (i) of this proposition shows the progression comparison between singles and couples 
at any given living standard can go either way;  ( ) ( ) , ax x ε  could be bigger or less than 1 (cf. 
Donaldson and Pendakur (1999)). In two particularly interesting cases, those of constant rela-
tive and absolute equivalence scales, we can go further. For the constant relative scale (under 
NHE-A) the couples face unambiguously less progression than the singles. For the constant 
absolute scale (the most natural situation in which to apply NHE-A) couples face more pro-
gression. Since HE is equivalent to NHE-A in this case, evidently HE cannot be a progression 
preserving principle. 
Suppose now that HE is invoked and that  ( ) Sx is interpreted as  ( ) x mx. The following may 
be deduced from (5). 
  () ()
( ) ( )











=   − 
 (19) 
Proposition 5 
Suppose that Sx xmx b g b g =  and that HE is satisfied. Then 
  () () () () () () () () ,, cs c c
x







A particular implication is that for an equivalence scale  ( ) mx whose elasticity increases 
(decreases) with income, progression for couples is higher (lower) than for corresponding 
singles. For a nonconstant scale with constant income elasticity (such as the scale 
() () mx x x
α β =  of Donaldson and Pendakur) the principle HE is thus progression pre-
serving.  
It proves impossible to infer any meaningful or useful properties in terms of liability progres-
sion for the principle HE when we interpret  ( ) Sx as either  ( ) x mx or  () x ax − . However a 
final manipulation yields the following connection between liability and residual progression 











sc c s s
x
mv x t
mx LP x RP x
xx x x
LP m x m v x m v x t RP





−− + −   
  
 (20) 
From this we can conclude as follows: 
Proposition 6 
Suppose that  () () Sx x mx =  and that HE is satisfied. Then 
(i) If  () mx is decreasing in x, then 
  () () () ()
cs cs
x x
RP x RP LP x LP
mx mx
 
<⇒ >    
 
. 
(ii) If  () mx is increasing in x, then 
  () () () ()
cs cs
x x
RP x RP LP x LP
mx mx
 
>⇒ <    
 
. 
In both cases the effect on liability progression is in the same direction as the effect on resid-
ual progression. 
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5.  Summary and conclusions 
In this paper we have explored the question of tax design and the implications for progression 
when the equivalence scale is income dependent. Three different principles of horizontal 
equity have been exposed and their consequences for tax design have been investigated. In 
particular we found that horizontal equity does not generally ensure that couples face the 
same degree of progression as singles. Our analysis has also covered constant relative and 
absolute scales as special cases. The findings in these cases are important in their own right 
since most empirical analyses up to now have used constant scales.  
Table 1 summarizes these findings. 









RP RP LP LP
HE
RP RP

















RP RP LP LP
HE










Table 1:  Horizontal equity and progression for constant equivalence scales. 
Only in the most familiar case of income splitting (i.e. constant relative scale and NHE-R 
which is equivalent to HE in this scenario) do couples face the same degree of progression as 
singles. However, we have also shown that the principle HE is progression preserving in the 
case of the income dependent, isoelastic relative scale, which has been advocated on other 
grounds by Donaldson and Pendakur (1999). 
Comparing the three principles NHE-R, NHE-A, and HE we have seen that the naïve versions 
are transparent and lead to taxes whose progression properties are more easily delineated. On 
the other hand the pure principle HE though less tractable is formally more correct. Transpar-  - 13 -
ency is important for the policy makers, but so is horizontal equity. The naïve principles offer 
transparency. HE guarantees classical horizontal equity. If we would add progression preser-
vation as a new ‘equity’ principle then, we have shown, this can be achieved with the iso-
elastic relative scale and HE. This includes income splitting under NHE-R as a special case.  
Future research should look more closely at the progression preservation criterion and also 
seek to extend the analysis to benefits and indeed to combined tax and benefit systems (see 
Ebert and Lambert (1999) on this). 
   - 14 -
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Appendix 
General rules  (see e.g. Berck and Sydsaeter (1993)) 
Assume that  f :RR →  and g:R R →  and that f and g are differentiable.  
(E1)  εε ε fx g xx fxx g xx b g b g c h b g c h b g c h ,, , =+ 
(E2)  εε ε f x gx x f x x gx x b g c b g h b g c h b g c h ,, , =− 
(E3)  () () () ()
() () () ()( )
() () () () ,,,
fx gx
f x g xx fxx g xx
fx gx fx gx
εε ε += +
++
 
(E4)  () () () ()
() () () ()( )
() () () () ,,,
fx gx
f xg x x f x x g x x
fx gx fx gx
εε ε −= −
−−
 
   if  fx g x b g b g −≠ 0 
(E5)  εε ε fg x x fg x g x g xx bg c h di bg c h bg di bg c h ,, , =  
Proof of Proposition 2 




() () () () ()











vx a vx xxa x





⇔=   −− 
⇔− = −  
so that (5) and (10) are equivalent. 
(ii)  Suppose that NHE-R ≡ NHE-A 
Then 
  () () ()
cs
x






as in (2) for all x and all feasible  () mx. - 16 - 
Now suppose that 
























On the other hand 
  () () () () cs v x v x ax ax =− + = NHE-A as in (18). 
Thus 
 
() () () () () ()
() () ()
() ()
() () () ()
()







v x ax v x ax ax
xa x
ax
vxa x a x
xa x









Proof of (16) 
 
() () ()
() () () () ()
() () ()
() () () () ()
() () () () () ( )
by (2). Now
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, , by (E1)








vx m x v
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x
RP x v x x m x v x
mx
x
mx x v x
mx
xx x
mx x v x
mx mx mx
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==      
 
=+      
   
=+            
 
=+ −      
() by( E 2 ) x  
 - 17 - 
Thus 
 















b g b g ch bg b g ch di
bg bg ch di bg bg ch di






















Proof of (17) 
Starting from 
  () () ()
cs
x






the proof of (17) is analogous to the proof of (16) 
Proof of (18) 
 
() ( ) ()
() () () () () ()
() () () () () ()
,,





LP x t x x t x a x x







This reduces directly to (18). 
Proof of Proposition 4 
 
() () () ()







() () () () () () () ()
() () () ()
() () ()




, , by (E3)
,, , b y ( E 5 )
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vx vxa x a x
RP x v x x v x a x a x x
vxa x ax
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va
v x ax x ax x ax x ax x
va va
xa x a xx
vxa xR Pxa x a x a xx
xa x















−   =
−+
 - 18 - 
Hence (i) is obvious. 
For (ii), note that if  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ,1 , x ax x ax x εε −= =  then 
  ()





vxa xR Pxa x a x
RP x





which is equivalent to 
  () ( ) () ()( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) () cs c s s RPxv x ax R Pxax v x ax R Px ax ax −+ = − −+  
or 
  () () () () () () () () ( ) 1 sc s c v x ax R Px R Px ax ax R Px −− − = − . 





() () () () ()























≤⇔ − ≤ − − +
−+ −




  () ( ) cs RPx R Pxa ≤−  - 19 - 
Proof of (19) 
 
() () ()() ()
() () () () ()()
() () () ()
() () () () () () ()
() () () () () () () () ()
1
,,
, , by (E1)











RP x v x x m v x v x
mx
x
mv x x v x
mx
x
m vx vx vxx v x
mx
xx










==      
 
=+      
 
=+      
 
 =+ −       



















 =−   

 
proving the result. 
Proof of (20) 
Using a result from Lambert (2001) (exercise 8.2.2, page 198) we obtain 










































−         −=     

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   =
    
−+    








and (20) now follows. 
 